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FRIEDRICHS: AN UNEXPECTED TOOL
FOR LABOR
Heather M. Whitney*
Today, about half of U.S. states allow unions and public-sector
employers to privately negotiate for agency shop arrangements. Under such an arrangement, employees in a bargaining unit who choose
to not join the union (and thus do not pay membership dues) are required to pay a fee to the union that covers their share of the costs the
union bears as their collective bargaining representative. 1 Unions
cannot avoid these costs. As is the case under the NLRA for privatesector unions, states require an exclusive bargaining representative
regime. That is, if workers want to guarantee that their employer will
sit down and bargain with their representative, those workers must
ensure that their chosen representative is not just chosen by them but
supported by a majority of workers in their bargaining unit – a bargaining unit they do not get to choose for themselves. 2 Once their

* Bigelow Fellow & Lecturer in Law, University of Chicago Law School. The author
wishes to thank Will Baude, Genevieve Lakier, and Laura Weinrib.
1
See, e.g., Jurupa Unified School District and National Education Association – Jurupa, Collective Bargaining Agreement at section 6 (July 1, 2014) (Membership/Service Fees provision) (the CBA at issue in Friedrichs).
2
For public teachers in California this is mandated under the Education Employment Relation Act. Under the Act, public school teachers have the right to “form, join,
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representative is chosen by a majority in that unit, the representative
is then the exclusive representative for all the unit members, even
those who do not want that representative bargaining on their behalf.
Because the union represents all members of the bargaining unit, the
law also requires the union to represent all members equally. The
union cannot, for instance, bargain for a raise for union members
only. If the union extracts additional benefits from the employer on
behalf of workers, both union members and non-members must
share in those gains equally.3
As a result of government-imposed exclusive representation and
fair representation requirements, the government has created its own
free rider problem. Once the union has been elected, a worker knows
she will get any benefits the union can provide without ever having
to join, and thus pay membership dues to, that union. Agency fees
(also known as “fair share” fees) are intended to combat this problem. By requiring non-members of the bargaining unit to pay their
share of the costs, some free riding is avoided.
Despite the importance of agency fees to avoiding the problem
of the free rider, this Court may soon find that the agency fee system
violates the First Amendment rights of the workers required to pay
them. The Supreme Court previously considered and rejected this argument in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
There, the Court held that requiring non-members to pay the union
for the costs it incurred for collective bargaining and contract administration did not violate the First Amendment, though requiring non-

and participate in the activities of employee organizations of their choosing for the
purpose of representation on all matters of employer-employee relations.” Cal. Gov’t
Code § 3543(a). Exclusive representation is required under § 3544-3544.9.
3
This includes arbitration over statutory rights. See Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556
U.S. 247, 271 (2009) (finding duty extended to arbitrating age discrimination claims
under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) when the collective
bargaining agreement required arbitration of those claims).
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members to pay for the union’s political activities would. In Friedrichs
v. California Teachers Association, the Court will squarely address
whether it should overturn Abood. The argument is that the distinction Abood drew between political and non-political union speech is
an impossible one, as all union speech in the public-sector context is
political and thus all compelled funding is unconstitutional. The
Court will also decide whether an opt-in system of dues payments is
constitutionally required. Betting on what the Court will do is a dangerous game but, at least prior to Justice Scalia’s unexpected death,
it seemed likely, given language in other recent cases, that Abood
would be overturned and public-sector employers will no longer be
free to negotiate agency shop arrangements with their workers’ unions.4 Now, though, the outcome is even less certain, though it seems
plausible the Court will split 4-4 and Abood will live to see another
day.
There are a lot of issues that have to be dealt with in Friedrichs –
why and when compelled funding compelled speech and whether
the fact that the government is acting as an employer will come to
bear on the Court’s First Amendment analysis being just two of them.
These are important questions that many scholars will cover in the
lead-up to this case. I will not add to the pile. Instead, here I want to
think about this case from a different perspective. That is, if the Court
were to overturn Abood, now or in the future, what that means for
unions and the future of labor more generally. There are three questions I want to focus on: first, does the government-created free rider
problem, where unions are required to provide free services to nonmembers, create a takings issue? I think under current precedent the
answer is no. Second, if it violates the First Amendment to require

4
See Knox v. Service Employees International Union, Local 1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277
(2012); see also Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618 (2014) (refusing to apply Abood to
“quasi” public sector workers and thus finding the agency shop arrangement to violate the First Amendment).
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non-members to pay agency fees, does the entire exclusive bargaining regime and corresponding duty of fair representation violate the
First Amendment rights of unions? I think there are reasons to believe
it does. And last, what effect will Friedrichs and its progeny have on
the future of labor organization? Here I suggest that while it is possible these cases will “kill” labor, there is another story that is possible
and indeed supported by history and current events: a backlash
against union repression resulting in the mobilization of labor. No
longer finding the NLRA and state-equivalent bargain worth the
price, workers may decide it better to fight outside that system. Below I take each of these questions in turn.
TAKINGS FROM UNIONS
Does requiring the union to provide services to non-paying nonmembers constitute a taking, at least when doing so requires the union to expend money? If you take the position that “all regulations,
all taxes, and all modifications of liability rules [should be understood
as] takings of private property prima facie compensable by the state”
the answer is easy: yes.5 Conversely, if you are an originalist and believe the Takings Clause was narrowly meant to require compensation when the government exercises its power of eminent domain –
that is, when the government physically seized property – the answer
is also easy: no.6 But if what we are asking is whether there is a colorable argument that requiring exclusive representation that nonmembers do not have to pay for constitutes a takings given current
case law, the answer is complicated. The Court’s takings jurisprudence is a conceptual mess.7 Given that, while there are some cases

RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT
DOMAIN (1985).
6
For this view see William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782, 840 (1995).
7
See id. at 782 n.6 (listing other scholars who have taken this view).
5
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that support such a conclusion, those cases stand on unstable conceptual grounds.8
That the prohibition on agency fees could constitute a taking
when combined with the duty of fair representation appears to have
been first suggested by Chief Judge Wood, in her dissent in Sweeney
v. Pence.9 There, the Seventh Circuit had to decide whether Indiana’s
“right to work” law was preempted by federal labor legislation and,
even if it was not preempted, whether it violated the First Amendment rights of unions.10 As Chief Judge Wood saw it, the duty of fair
representation in conjunction with the Indiana statute, which prohibited the employer and union from negotiating any contract that required non-members to pay money to the union to cover their share
of the costs,11 meant the state took the union’s money by requiring
the union to expend money to provide services to non-members.
Judge Wood found this scheme to look like the one struck down in
Brown v. Legal Foundation of Washington.12 There, a state required interest income that was generated by clients’ funds held in lawyers’
trust accounts to be transferred from the account to a foundation that
provided legal services to the poor. The Court held in Brown that the
interest was the property of the clients and if the government was
going to require it to be transferred from the account to the foundation, that action had to be justified under the Takings Clause.13 Brown
involved the government explicitly required a transfer of money
from one private party to another while the Indiana statute required
unions to provide services but was agnostic about which money (if

8
This is a change from my prior position. See, e.g., Heather Whitney, When Does
Labor Law Violate the Takings Clause, PRAWFSBLAWG (July 2, 2015); see also Heather Whitney, Guest Post: The Takings Clause and Sweeney v. Pence, ONLABOR (Sep. 4, 2014).
9
Full disclosure: I clerked for Chief Judge Wood.
10
Sweeney v. Pence, 767 F.3d 654 (7th Cir. 2014).
11
See Ind. Code § 22-6-6.
12
538 U.S. 216 (2003).
13
See id. at 235.
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any) had to be spent to provide them, that distinction was thought
irrelevant for purposes of a takings analysis by both the majority and
dissent. For its part, the majority found that to the extent there was a
taking, the union was justly compensated for it through its continued
exclusive bargaining representative power.14
While the majority’s response is unconvincing,15 there is another
difficulty with finding a taking and it happens at the threshold. What
private property does the government take when it requires a private
party to provide services to another? 16 In this case, it appears to be
the money a particular union would have to spend to provide the
requisite services. But the argument that whenever the government

Sweeney, 767 F.3d at 21.
For one, this argument looks much like the one rejected in Loretto. There the Court
said that “a landlord’s ability to rent his property may not be conditioned on his forfeiting the right to compensation for a physical occupation.” 458 U.S. at 439 n.17. The
Court went on to say that such an argument “would allow the government to require
a landlord to devote a substantial portion of his building to vending and washing machines, with all profits to be retained by the owners of these services and with no compensation for the deprivation of space. It would even allow the government to requisition a certain number of apartments as permanent government offices.” Id. The majority’s argument is similar. A union could avoid the requirement by ceasing to be the
bargaining representative of the workers who exercised their federal and state rights
to be represented by one just as a landlord could refuse the requirement by ceasing to
be a landlord, but being a landlord and being a bargaining representative may not be
so conditioned. See id. at 439 n.17. Moreover, as the Court most recently reaffirmed in
Horne, its “cases have set forth a clear and administrable rule for just compensation:
‘The Court has repeatedly held that just compensation normally is to be measured by
‘the market value of the property at the time of the taking.’” Horne v. U.S. Dep’t of
Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2432 (2015) (citing United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S.
24, 29 (1984) (quoting Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934)). The compensation is the market value of the property (here, money) the government took, not a hazy
theory that the mandated exclusive representation regime is a form of compensation
for another mandate the union did had little choice but to accept.
16
As scholars have noted, this threshold requirement is too often assumed. See
Thomas Merrill, The Landscape of Constitutional Property, 86 VA. L. REV. 885, 891 n.20
(collecting scholarship criticizing the Court and scholars for overlooking this question). It is an assumption I have been guilty of in prior writings on this topic. See supra
note 8.
14
15
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requires someone to provide a benefit to another the Takings Clause
applies was rejected by a majority of the Justices in Eastern Enterprises
v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498 (1998). There, a statute enacted in 1992 required
companies that used to be in coal mining business to contribute to a
fund providing for the health-related expenses of retired miners and
their families. The statute required Eastern Enterprises to pay for
such benefits for miners it employed between 1946 and 1965, even
though it never agreed to provide those benefits in the original collective bargaining agreements. The expected liability created by the
statute was between $50 and $100 million. While the parties did not
raise the issue, nor did the Justices at oral arguments, the Justices
were split on whether the Coal Act took any property within the
meaning of the Takings Clause at all. In total, five justices found that
it did not.17 As Justice Kennedy put it, “[t]he law simply imposes an
obligation to perform an act, the payment of benefits. The statute is
indifferent as to how the regulated entity elects to comply or the
property it uses to do so . . . To call this sort of governmental action
a taking as a matter of constitutional interpretation is both imprecise
and . . . unwise.”18 Indeed, the Court had previously rejected the argument that a takings occurs “whenever legislation requires one person to use his or her assets for the benefit of another.”19
While the line between a taking and regulation is already “difficult to discern or to maintain,” extending the regulatory takings doctrine to situations like this one, where the duty merely requires the
union to perform a service, and where no specific property right or

While there were five votes to find the Act unconstitutional, four did so as a takings and the fifth vote, by Justice Kennedy, found the act a violation of substantive
due process while expressly finding the Act did not take property within the meaning
of the Takings Clause.
18
Eastern Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 540 (1998).
19
Eastern Enters., 524 U.S. at 555–556 (Breyer, J. dissenting) (quoting Connoll v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, 475 U.S. 211, 225 (1986)).
17
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interest is at stake, arguably takes what is already “one of the most
difficult and litigated areas of the law” and makes it more so. 20 This
is not to say that the requirement that unions provide free services to
non-members is not a burden, but if the line between takings on one
side and permissible taxes and regulations on the other is to be maintained, finding a takings is more trouble than it is worth.
COMPELLED SPEECH AND ASSOCIATION BY UNIONS
The next question worth considering in a post-Friedrichs world is
whether, if compelling non-members to pay agency fees to public
sector unions violates the First Amendment, union’s First Amendment rights are infringed by both the exclusive bargaining regime
and corresponding duty of fair representation.
If the Court overturns Abood, it will likely do so by rejecting the
distinction Abood made between a union’s non-political and political
speech and instead find all public sector union speech to be political.21 Once collective bargaining-related speech is considered political, requiring unions to engage in that speech on behalf of non-members (by imposing on them the duty of exclusive representation)
should also be considered compelled political speech and compelled

Id. at 540, 542.
Of course, the Court could go the other way. That is, it could take the position
that compelled funding raises no First Amendment issues at all, even with the union
speaking politically. Like in Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic Institutional Rights,
Inc., 547 U.S. 47 (2006), the Court could find that agency fees do not involve compelled
speech because the non-members are not required to say anything and remain “free
… to express whatever views they may have on the [union’s collective bargaining activities].” Id. at 60. Or the Court could find the compelled funding “ancillary to a more
comprehensive program restricting [labor relations] autonomy” and thus acceptable.
See United States v. United Foods, 533 U.S. 405, 406 (2001) (distinguishing Glickman,
where mandatory assessments to promote tree fruit were upheld against a First
Amendment challenge). I do not mean to suggest the Court could not come to such a
conclusion. However, here I mean to imagine a post-Friedrichs world where plaintiffs
win.
20
21
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expressive association. The same is true of the requirement that they
provide services to non-members (the duty of fair representation).
Start with the duty of fair representation. As mentioned previously, the duty arises from the union’s role as the exclusive bargaining representative and requires the union to represent all employees
within the unit “without hostile discrimination, fairly, impartially,
and in good faith.”22 The duty applies at all stages of collective bargaining, from negotiations to contract enforcement. Between requiring the union to represent and bargain on behalf of non-members,
prohibiting it to favor its own members, and requiring equal treatment through contract enforcement, the law compels unions to speak
and negotiate with certain individuals. Post-Friedrichs that is compelled political speech and association. 23
To overcome this infringement on the union’s First Amendment
rights, other scholars have argued that the government must demonstrate that it has a “compelling interest in requiring unions to negotiate and grieve their nonmembers’ complaints without receiving just
compensation and that this duty [is] narrowly tailored to effectuate
that interest.”24 But that is the wrong question for two reasons. First,

22
Steele v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 204 (1944) (under the Railway Labor
Act). The duty was extended to unions operating under the auspices of the National
Labor Relations Act in Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman. California mandated the duty via
statute. See e.g., California Educational Employment Relations Act, Government Code
section 3544.9; Higher Education Employer-Employee Relations Act section 3578. California adopted the federal test for determining whether a union violated the duty of
fair representation in Romero v. Rocklin Teachers Association (1980). A union violates
this duty if it acts in an “arbitrary, discriminatory, or bad faith” manner. See Vaca v.
Snipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177 (1967).
23
Indeed, Harris, where the Court held that the agency fee arrangement for quasi
public sector workers violated the First Amendment already found that bargaining is
political speech in the public-sector context. See Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618 (2014).
24
Catherine L. Fisk & Margaux Poueymirou, Harris v. Quinn and the Contradictions
of Compelled Speech, 48 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 439, 488 (2014).
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whether the union is reimbursed for the compelled speech and association the government requires it to take on may be relevant to
whether the system exacts as taking from the union but is irrelevant
to whether the government has a compelling interest in compelling
that speech and association in the first instance. We do not think the
problem in Barnette, where school children were unconstitutionally
compelled to salute the American flag, was that the government required that salute without paying the students, nor do we think the
problem would have been different if payment were involved; the
issue was whether the government had a compelling interest in forcing the students to salute. In the exclusive representation context, the
government compels the union to speak on behalf of non-members
and to speak for them equally as much as the union speaks for its
own members. Post-Friedrichs, this set-up compels the union to speak
and associate politically. Thus, in order to overcome the First
Amendment challenge, the government must demonstrate a compelling interest in requiring that exclusive representation regime.
One might stop here and argue that the government does not
compel an exclusive bargaining regime. The union could instead operate a “members only” union, and indeed the language of the statute
at issue in Friedrichs suggests the availability of that option.25 However, that option is not in fact available to the union. In order for public sector workers to exercise their right to have their employer sit
down and negotiate with the representative of their choosing, that
representative is required under California law to be the exclusive
representative of that workers’ bargaining unit. 26 The same is true
under the NLRA. While the plain language of section 7 guarantees

25
See Cal. Gov’t Code § 3543.1(a) (“Employee organizations shall have the right to
represent their members in their employment relations with public school employers”).
26
See Cal. Gov’t Code § 3543.
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covered employees “the right to . . . bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing,” the Board has held that employers are not required to bargain with member-only labor organizations.27 Thus, in order for workers to guarantee their ability to bargain through representatives of their own choosing, that representative must represent all members of that worker’s bargaining unit. In
the same way a non-member of the bargaining unit is “forced” to pay
agency fees (or find another job), the members and union are
“forced” to associate with and speak with non-members (or lose their
statutory right to negotiate through the representative of their choosing). As long as the former constitutes an unconstitutional condition, 28 so too should the latter; their First Amendment challenges
should rise and fall together.29

27
See NLRB Advice Memorandum, Dick’s Sporting Goods, Case No. 6-CA-34821
(June 22, 2006), available at http://www.nlrb.gov/shared_files/Advice%
20Memo/RecenfReleases/6-CA-34821(06-22-06).pdf (NLRB General Counsel refused
to issue a complaint against employer who declined to recognize and bargain with
member-only union, finding “the employer in these circumstances had no obligation
to recognize and bargain with the Council. This principle is well-settled and not an
open issue . . . the statutory obligation to bargain is fundamentally grounded on the
principle of majority rule.”). See also NLRB Advice Memorandum, Charleston Nursing
Center, Case No. 11-CA-8753, available at http://apps.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/09031d45800b2f0b (finding employer did not interfere with employees’
section 7 right to bargain collectively when it refused to meet with a group of workers).
28
And recall in the context of the NLRA, the Court has found the right of employees
to self-organize and select representatives of their own choosing for collective bargaining or other mutual protection without restraint or coercion by their employer a “fundamental right.” See Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Co., 301 U.S.
1, 33 (1937).
29
Another parallel worth drawing is between the First Amendment rights giving
to corporations and unions. If one believes states cannot condition access to incorporation on the waiver of First Amendment rights, then one should also believe states
cannot condition the right to negotiate collectively through a chosen representative on
the waiver of First Amendment rights. While there are interesting arguments for why
the state should be able to condition access to the corporate form in this way but assume for purposes of this article that the current Supreme Court does not take that
position.
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The question we are now left with is whether the government, in
2016, can demonstrate a compelling interest in requiring an exclusive
representative regime. The Court has previously recognized “that a
single employee [is] helpless in dealing with an employer; that he [is]
dependent ordinarily on his daily wage for the maintenance of himself and family; that, if the employer refused to pay him the wages
that he thought fair, he [is] nevertheless unable to leave the employ
and resist arbitrary and unfair treatment; that union[s] [are] essential
to give laborers [the] opportunity to deal on an equality with their
employer.”30 This is the reality for a large share of workers and as the
Court has said, Congress “[is] not required to ignore” the need for
collective action given this reality, and can thus “safeguard it.” 31 Let
us then assume that the government has a compelling interest in regulating the employer-employee relationship in light of the risk of arbitrary and unfair treatment of the much less powerful workers at
the hands of employers. Promoting and safeguarding worker collective action is a reasonable way to approach it, but we are still left with
whether an exclusive bargaining regime is sufficiently tailored to
promote that interest. And here the argument becomes more difficult. The government does not require unionization. The default is
non-unionization and at least one of the aims of the NLRA regime is
to ensure employees can freely choose to unionize or not. 32 Why, if
workers choose to unionize, must they unionize under an exclusive
bargaining regime? It is understandable why the state of California
prefers exclusive representation based on majority rule – dealing with
a single representative for all workers may be easier than dealing

Jones, 301 U.S. at 33–34.
Id.
32
See NLRB v. A.J. Tower Co., 329 U.S. 324, 330 (1946) (explaining that Congress
requires the Board to establish the rules and “safeguards necessary to insure the fair
and free choice of bargaining representatives by employees”).
30
31
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with many.33 But, first, in the absence of unionization, public-sector
employers are in the much more burdensome position of negotiating
individually with each employee. And second, convenience is no response to whether exclusive representation is properly tailored to the
government’s legitimate interest. The government and labor scholars
must accept the challenge of justifying the imposition of exclusive
representation where, post-Friedrichs, it compels political speech and
association. I am doubtful it can be done.
Instead of scholars defending the government’s compelling interest in having an exclusive bargaining regime, some scholars have
argued for members-only (also known as minority) unions.34 At least
one has argued that the NLRA can be read to allow for member only
unions today. 35 In my own work I have highlighted how workers
have worked together to extract gains totally outside the exclusive
representation regime.36 While it may be that in a world without exclusive representation workers need additional protections when
striking, picketing, and engaging in secondary boycotts, all of those
protections could be given without compelling union and non-members political speech and association.
MOBILIZATION OF LABOR
So far I have raised and speculated about potential post-Friedrichs First and Fifth Amendment issues. I want to end by speculating

33
See San Mateo City Sch. Dist. v. Pub. Employment Relations Bd., 663 P.2d 523,
531 (1983).
34
Though they have only argued for this in right to work states and do not suggest
it replace the exclusive bargaining regime elsewhere. See Catherine Fisk & Benjamin I.
Sachs, Restoring Equity in Right to Work, 4 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 859 (2014).
35
See CHARLES MORRIS, THE BLUE EAGLE AT WORK: RECLAIMING DEMOCRATIC
RIGHTS IN THE AMERICAN WORKPLACE (2005).
36
See Heather M. Whitney, Rethinking the Ban on Employer-Labor Organization Cooperation, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 101 (2016), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2663593.
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about the social and political implications of not just overturning
Abood but of overturning it in an environment where NLRA-style unionization is already difficult to achieve and an increasingly unattractive option for those interested in furthering the interests of workers.37 Here I suggest that while the dominant story is that Friedrichs
and its progeny are killing off unions, that story may be wrong. There
is instead an alternative story and it is one of worker and union backlash against courts and business interests they perceive as attacking
them.38 On this story, Friedrichs and its progeny have unintentionally
created a focal point – a rallying cry – around which workers and
unions can mobilize, radicalize, and develop creative and powerful
alternatives to New Deal-type unionization. Indeed, we may be in
the early days of that backlash now.
In her Harris dissent, Justice Kagan rightly pointed out that
where the law compels the union to represent members and nonmembers equally while also prohibiting agency fee arrangements, it
is in the economic self-interest of both those who support and oppose
the union to withhold payment. 39 However, while Justice Kagan
seemed to worry that the absence of short-term economic self-interest would result in the financial ruin of unions, we know that is not
the case. Today, 25 states already have right-to-work laws and in

37
Many scholars, myself included, have documented the Board and court-created
difficulties modern unions face. See, e.g., id., DAVID WEIL, THE FISSURED WORKPLACE:
WHY WORK BECAME SO BAD FOR SO MANY AND WHAT CAN BE DONE (2014); Katherine
Stone, Rethinking Labour Law: Employment Protections for Boundaryless Workers, in
BOUNDARIES AND FRONTIERS OF LABOUR LAW 155 (Guy Davidov & Brian Langille eds.,
2006).
38
Backlash against Court decisions has been documented previously. See Michael
J. Klarman, How Brown Changed Race Relations: The Backlash Thesis, 81 J. AM. HIST. 81
(1994).
39
See Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 22 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
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those states we have not seen unions fall into financial peril.40 Instead
the enactment of such laws appears to result in a small drop in union
membership.41 But given that paying the union in right-to-work jurisdictions can be understood as financially irrational, what might
explain worker support? Justice Kagan thought altruism or loyalty
the only available alternative explanations,42 but there are others. Unions are among the types of private associations that make up a vibrant civil society and make available to individuals a community
and sense of identity. Joining and supporting a union can be an important social and political act, particularly in the wake of court decisions that are perceived as an attempt to kill unions. Worker solidarity and mutual aid, upon which unions are founded, are after all
political and social ideals.43 And, while it is too early to say, it may
well be that as the Court exacerbates the free rider problem unions
face, unions will look to stoke within workers the embers of a solidarity ethos that were neglected so long as access to member money
did not require activation of such class consciousness. 44 Group solidarity is in turn an important precondition for the creation of social

40
See Scott Cohn, An American Workplace War That’s Reached a Tipping Point, CNBC
(May 29, 2015), http://www.cnbc.com/2015/05/29/the-right-to-work-battle-hasreached-a-tipping-point.html.
41
Here I am referring to drops in membership among bargaining units already organized prior to the enactment of the right to work law. Bureau of Labor Statistics data
from 2000 to 2014 suggests that in right to work states union membership stabilizes at
around 84 percent of represented workers. In contrast, states with agency fees over the
same 14-year period saw approximately 93 percent of represented workers as full union members. See Bureau of Labor Statistics, Economic News Release: Union Members
Summary (Jan. 23, 2015), available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.nr0.htm. The Mackinac Center for Public Policy shows these findings most
clearly. See Mackinac Center for Public Policy, Amicus Brief in Support of Petitioners
at 21-22, Friedrichs v. California Teachers Association 2015 WL 407687 (U.S. 2015).
42
See id.
43
See PETER KROPOTKIN, MUTUAL AID: A FACTOR OF EVOLUTION (1902).
44
See JULIUS G. GETMAN, RESTORING THE POWER OF UNIONS: IT TAKES A MOVEMENT
(2010) (arguing that organized labor needs to return to its activist member-powered
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movement organization, like labor organizations, and social movement activism more generally.45
Public sector unions’ preemptive response to Friedrichs suggests
such stoking has begun. Not intending to sit passively by and await
their demise, the possible elimination of agency fees has mobilized
the organizations. The president of AFSCME said in a recent interview that agency fee arrangements had made the teachers’ union
complacent. “I think we took things for granted. We stopped communicating with people, because we didn’t feel like we needed to.
That was the wrong approach, and we don’t want to fall back in to
that trap.”46 In anticipation of Friedrichs the union has taken steps to
remedy that error, creating a more engaged membership – a membership that feels invested in and solidarity with the union and its
leadership. 47 Other union leaders have expressed similar sentiments.48
Workers and union mobilization in response to a judiciary it
thinks illegitimate would not be a historical anomaly. In the early
twentieth century, something similar happened and labor went outside the formal channels of politics and litigation and instead acted
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directly, through mass protests, strikes, and boycotts. 49 Today, we
see workers doing something not dissimilar, though admittedly so
far on a much smaller scale. Recognizing that the benefits of massive
government regulation is no longer worth the costs, workers are developing non-traditional forms of worker organizations that entirely
bypass the NLRA and its state equivalents. “Fight for $15,” a movement backed heavily by the SEIU to raise the minimum wage for fast
food workers to $15 an hour, is one particularly successful version of
this. The Immokalee Workers, who work to better conditions of tomato pickers in Florida by targeting reputation-sensitive companies
like Taco Bell and national grocery stores at the top of the food supply chain (instead of their direct employers) are another. 50 For these
non-traditional organizations, Friedrichs does nothing to slow their
momentum.
In short, while Friedrichs may well overturn Abood and with it a
compromise that has lasted for decades, between the First Amendment arguments it makes available to unions and the backlash that is
already brewing in response to it and the conditions in which workers currently find themselves, I suspect the case will ultimately be to
the good of workers and their organizations.
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